Valuation of Morality and Mind: Morality as a Metacognitive Byproduct (19 July 2016a - Preprint Draft)

A positive association was confirmed between valuation of explicit morality, neutral (general) mind as measured by sentience, and significance of (specific) mind as measured by integrity (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The moral worth ratings of a protagonist were affected by manipulating perceived significance of mind as expressed by scope and intensity of thought (7). 50% of participants thought morality applies exclusively to creatures with minds (8, 9).

A positive association was found between the self-awareness and moral worth ratings of a variety of creatures and human characters (10). Furthermore, the moral worth ratings of a human being and `philosophical phantom' (sentient inanimate object) were greater than those of a philosophical zombie and rock (11). This research suggests that morality is based on the belief in mind.

Contrary to H. Gray et al. [1] however, the results suggest that valuation of experience (sentience) and agency (significance of mind) are not independent, as morality appears preconditioned upon the perception of (or assumption of) sentience. Furthermore, contrary to dyadic models [2], preliminary analysis supported the prediction of self and other-directed morality.