Data · dataset · 2007
Replication data for: A Dynamic Calculus of Voting
Listed in Harvard Dataverse
We construct a decision-theoretic model of turnout, in which individuals maximize their subjective expected utility in a context of repeated elections.
Description
In the model a nonnegative signaling motivation to vote exists for all citizens, regardless of their ideology or beliefs about the closeness of the election, and is proportional to a citizen's external efficacy, patience, and electoral pessimism. We find tentative support for all three effects in an empirical model of turnout using NES data (1976-1988).
This paper suggests that the signaling motivation may play a role in a citizen’s decision to vote.
Links
Where it is published
- Dataverse dataset page dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FAR8RLF ↗
landing page · from Harvard Dataverse
- DOI doi.org/10.7910/dvn/ar8rlf ↗
DOI / persistent id · from Harvard Dataverse
Catalogue records · 1
- Dataverse API dataverse.harvard.edu/api/datasets/:persistentId/?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2… ↗
metadata API · from Harvard Dataverse
Provenance · 1 source records, 6 field assertions
| Source | Key | Last seen | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvard Dataverse | doi:10.7910/DVN/AR8RLF | 15 d ago | JSON v1 |
| Field | Assertion | Extractor | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| description | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /description |
| publication_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| title | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /name |
| updated_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| version_label | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 |