The UK’s legal framework for market integration in services and devolved regulatory autonomy. A missed opportunity?

It contrasts the legal scaffolding and constitutional underpinnings of the UK’s internal market for services with the governance structures which preceded whilst the UK was a member of the EU. Going beyond the silos of trade and the constitutional repercussions of Brexit, this study outlines how and why the current structure and legal framework of the UK’s internal market is based on a fundamentally flawed conception of how tools of internal market making are operationalised.

This analysis is conducted through the lens of legal federalist theory, a conceptual theory which provides economic criteria to determine the pros and cons of centralised/decentralised regulatory competence allocation whilst also considering the interplay of regulatory competition. Furthermore, the thesis presents rationale as to why alternative policy choices may mitigate the missed opportunity which, it is argued, the UK failed to take advantage of to bolster an internal market which complements its constitutional make-up and diverse political anatomy. <br><br><i>Thesis is embargoed until 31 July 2028</i>.<br>